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This paper presents a sentiment-based explanation of the forward premium puzzle. Agents 
over- or underestimate the growth rate of the economy. All else equal, when perceived 
domestic growth is higher than perceived foreign growth, the domestic interest rate is higher 
than the foreign interest rate. At the same time, an econometrician would expect an increase 
in the home currency value. Together, the model with investor misperception can account 
for the forward premium puzzle. In  addition, it helps explain the low correlation of 
consumption growth differentials and  exchange rate growth and the high stock market 
correlation across countries, despite a low correlation of fundamentals. Finally, this paper 
provides direct empirical evidence  supporting the mechanism in the sentiment-based 
explanation. 
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Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) implies that the expected change in exchange rates
(foreign price of domestic currency) should equal the interest rate dierential between the
foreign and domestic countries. Therefore, the regression coecient of future changes in
exchange rates on interest rate dierentials should equal one. However, Fama (1984) and
subsequent studies consistently nd a negative coecient in such regressions. That is, an
increase in the foreign interest rate forecasts an appreciation of the foreign currency. The
violation of UIP is often referred as the "forward premium puzzle" in the literature. This
evidence also implies that there are predictable returns from investing in currency markets.
The forward premium puzzle has inspired a vast theoretical work that arises to shed light
on this puzzle.
In this paper, building on the concept of sentiment risk of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), we oer a sentiment-based explanation of the
forward premium puzzle. In particular, we simply model a representative agent endowment
economy for each country with complete home bias, and the agents in dierent countries
share a common but subjective belief about future fundamentals. Agents can be optimistic
(i.e., high sentiment) or pessimistic (i.e., low sentiment) about future endowment growth.
When domestic sentiment is high, it means that both the home and foreign agents are
optimistic about future U.S. endowment growth.1 When agents are optimistic about the
domestic economy, and all else is equal, the interest rate at home is higher than the foreign
interest rate due to a strong desire to borrow to increase current consumption. Thus, the
1By modeling a representative agent in each country with homogeneous belief, we lose the interesting
dynamics on the wealth distribution among the heterogeneous agents, as in Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal
(2009) and Xiong and Yan (2010). Thus, it is certainly interesting to consider heterogeneous beliefs. However,
the purpose of the current paper is to illustrate that investor misperception can lead to the failure of UIP
in the simplest possible model. We thus choose a simpler modeling approach.
1key for our model to reproduce the failure of UIP is that high sentiment in one country can
lead to an appreciation of this country's currency.
In a complete market, the (log) change in exchange rates, measured in units of the foreign
goods per domestic goods, equals the dierence between the (log) stochastic discount factors
of the domestic and foreign countries. Hence, with recursive preferences, the exchange rate
has to adjust to re
ect dierences in both current and future relative consumption across
countries. When domestic sentiment is high today, high future growth at home is anticipated.
Hence, from the economic agents' point of view, the home currency is expected to depreciate
to re
ect the anticipated dierence in consumption across two countries in the future.
The magnitude of this anticipated depreciation depends on the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES). However, an econometrician anticipates that the economic agent at
home will receive a lower-than-expected endowment tomorrow, raising the marginal utility of
consumption next period, and hence the home currency appreciates. The magnitude of this
appreciation depends on the home agent's risk aversion since risk aversion determines the
reduction in the marginal utility. Therefore, the econometrician is likely to observe a smaller
depreciation or even an appreciation of home currency in the data. In particular, we show
that when risk aversion is greater than the inverse of IES, the second eect dominates and
high domestic sentiment predicts an appreciation of home currency from the econometrician's
point of view. All together, when domestic sentiment is relatively high, the home interest
rate is pushed up, and at the same time an appreciation of the domestic currency is expected.
This can qualitatively account for the violation of the UIP condition in the data.
We further explore the model's ability to account for other stylized facts in the
international markets. It is well documented that consumption growth is smooth and
poorly correlated across countries, whereas the asset market returns are volatile and highly
correlated across countries. It is also well known that the consumption growth dierentials
2and exchange rate growth are poorly correlated in the data. Our simple model can help
account for these patterns. The mechanism is very simple and similar in spirit to Colacito
and Croce (2011). As long as the sentiment is highly correlated across countries, the pricing
kernels are highly correlated. However, the realized consumption growth does not need to be
highly correlated across countries. Due to the high correlation between pricing kernels,
the asset returns are highly correlated, despite the lack of correlation of fundamentals.
Moreover, since exchange rates are driven by both fundamentals and investor sentiment,
the correlation between consumption growth dierentials and exchange rate growth is also
weakened, compared with traditional rational models (e.g., Backus and Smith (1993)).
Lastly, the high correlation of pricing kernels and the low correlation of fundamentals also
help address the exchange rate volatility puzzle raised by Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara
(2006).
Using a data set with bilateral exchange rates between 19 industrial countries and
the United States, we test the key refutable predictions for our model. For example,
our model predicts that high sentiment in one country forecasts an appreciation of the
country's currency, and high domestic sentiment predicts a low return on foreign exchange.
Using investor sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2006), we indeed nd that investor
sentiment has signicant power to forecast changes in exchange rates (relative to the U.S.
dollar) and returns on foreign exchange with a correct sign as predicted by our model, with
the same sign as predicted by the model. The results are strikingly consistent across all 19
industrial countries in the post-Bretton Woods period.
We also explore the predictive power of the "true" expected growth rate and the
"misperceived" growth rate (i.e., sentiment) in the currency market, and we nd that in
predicting changes in exchange rates, both variables have signicant power, but with an
opposite sign. Whereas high sentiment predicts a higher future spot rate, high true expected
3growth rates predict a lower spot rate in the future. This evidence highlights the distinct
role of sentiment and its special ability to account for a negative UIP coecient. In a
standard rational model, a high expected home-country growth rate predicts depreciation of
the home-country currency. Our evidence actually supports this prediction. However, high
expected home-country growth also implies a high domestic interest rate, hence leading to
a positive UIP coecient. On the other hand, a high misperceived domestic growth rate
is associated with a high domestic interest rate, but predicts an appreciation of the home
currency. Therefore, the misperception is crucial in generating a negative UIP coecient.
It is well known that the forward premium (i.e., the interest rate dierential between
foreign and domestic countries) strongly predicts returns on foreign exchange. This paper
further documents that investor sentiment has signicant additional power in forecasting
returns on foreign exchange. For many currencies, the R2 of a regression in which both
the forward premium and investor sentiment are included is more than double the R2 of a
regression in which the forward premium is the only predictor. Therefore, investor sentiment
contains information that is not captured by the forward premium.
Considerable prior work on the forward premium puzzle has been done. A number
of earlier studies have provided insightful analysis on the role of investor irrationality in
foreign exchange markets.2 Frankel and Froot (1987, 1990a) provide an early application of
irrationality to currency markets. Mark and Wu (1998) develop a model in the noise trading
setting of De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), in which traders overweigh
the forward premium when predicting future changes in the exchange rate. Gourinchas and
2There are numerous other studies attempt to explain this puzzle under rational expectations. Notable
recent papers include Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009) who examine a segmented market, Bacchetta and
Van Wincoop (2009) who use a rational inattention framework, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2007)
who include microstructure frictions, Farhi and Gabaix (2008) who employ a Rietz (1988) rare disaster
framework, and Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2009) who perform a
cross-sectional analysis of foreign exchange portfolios. Earlier equilibrium models that attempt to explain
the forward premium puzzle include Backus, Gregory, and Telmer (1993) and Bekaert (1996).
4Tornell (2004) provide an explanation based upon a distortion in investors' beliefs about
the interest rate process. Finally, in a closely related study, Burnside, Han, Hirshleifer, and
Wang (2011) oer an explanation based on investor overcondence on in
ation.
This paper adds to the previous literature by showing that investors' misperception on the
real growth rate can potentially induce a negative UIP coecient. Investors' misperception
could be derived endogenously from investor overcondence. For example, when investors
have a constant overcondence bias about their signal on the growth rate, a time-varying
misperception process can be generated endogenously in the framework of Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and Xiong and Yan (2010). Thus,
our approach allows us to use investor sentiment data to test the mechanisms inside our
model directly. Indeed, our empirical evidence lends direct support for a sentiment-based
explanation. More important, the same mechanism appears to help account for many salient
features in international markets simultaneously. In particular, investor sentiment generates
substantial long-run risk under recursive preferences, which helps account for many asset
pricing moments in the international data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the sentiment-based
exchange rate model and discusses its implications on the forward premium puzzle and
several other puzzles in the international markets. Section 3 presents empirical evidence on
the role of investor sentiment in the foreign exchange market. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. An Illustrative Example
In this section, we provide a simple example to convey the main idea of the paper. To make
the presentation transparent, we assume complete home biases and complete markets. Two
5countries are symmetric and representative investors in both countries have power preferences








Below we only consider domestic variables, and the corresponding foreign variables are
denoted with a superscript "*". Assume that the data generating process for consumption
growth is i.i.d. normal: gt+1 = g +gg;t+1. However, all investors (homogeneously) believe
that they can forecast consumption growth according to gt+1 = g + st + g^ g;t+1, where
^ t is i.i.d. standard normal under investors' perception. Here, st can be interpreted as
investor sentiment. It is worth emphasizing that we use the term "sentiment" in a very
broad sense. It simply represents the dierence between economic agents' (i.e., investors)
belief and econometricians' belief. This dierence in beliefs could be due to either rational
or irrational learning. Moreover, we do not impose any structure on the dynamics of the
sentiment process in this example. According to investors' belief, risk-free rates are:









Thus, the risk-free rate dierentials are:
r

f;t   rf;t = 
 (s

t   st): (2)
Under a frictionless complete market, the (log) exchange rate et is linked to domestic and
foreign discount factors mt and m
t by the following equation:3










3See Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001) for a rigorous argument. Among others, Backus, Foresi, and
Telmer (2001), Brandt, Cochrane and Santa-Clara (2006), and Colacito and Croce (2011) exploit this
equation to relate the dynamics of the exchange rate to the dynamics of the domestic and foreign discount
factors.
6where the (log) exchange rate is dened as the foreign price per home consumption unit.
Under investors' perception
^ Et (et+1   et) = 
 (s

t   st); (4)
where ^ Et () is the expectation under economic agents' subjective belief conditional on
information available up to time t. By looking at equation (2) and (4), it is clear that UIP
holds ex ante under investors' perception. However, ex-post exchange rates evolve according
to the actual data generating porcess, which is i.i.d. according to equation (3). Hence, an
econometrician regressing equation (3) on equation (2) would estimate a coecient zero.
Thus, the UIP condition fails in this simple example.
However, in this simple example, the correlation between consumption growth
dierentials and exchange rate growth is one (see equation (3)), whereas this correlaiton
is very low in the data (e.g., Backus and Smith (1993)). In the next section, we show that
under recursive preferences, the UIP coecient can be negative and the correlation between
consumption growth dierentials and exchange rate growth can also be substantially reduced.
3. An Exchange Rate Model with Investor Sentiment
In this section, we present a simple model of exchange rates with investor sentiment. To
highlight the eect of investor sentiment on the forward premium puzzle, the model abstracts
from money, and irrational belief is the only deviation from a standard two-country model.
Hollield and Yaron (2003) nd that in
ation risk is virtually unrelated to currency returns,
and they conclude that currency models should focus on real risk. We therefore abstract
our analysis from in
ation and focus on the real side of the economy. A few recent studies
7on currency markets (e.g., Verdelhan (2010), Colacito and Croce (2011), and Engel (2011))
also shift the focus to real variables. In particular, Engel (2011) shows that Fama's (1984)
results also hold in real terms.
3.1. Consumption Dynamics and Preferences
We analyze an economy with two countries that are denoted as domestic and foreign. To
simplify the setup, we follow Colacito and Croce (2011) by specifying a separate pure
exchange economy for each country. Consumption in the two countries is exogenously given
and there is a complete home bias, meaning that the representative agent in each country
only consumes the good with which he is endowed. Asset markets are complete. This setup
allows us to analyze the asset prices in each country separately. Due to complete markets, we
can then obtain the exchange rate dynamics by linking the pricing kernels in two countries.
For convenience, we characterize endowments, preferences, and prices only for the domestic
country. Identical expressions indexed by a "*" apply to the foreign country.
We consider a discrete-time economy with innite horizons. To highlight the role in
sentiment, we rst assume that the true data-generating process for the consumption growth
rate, gt  log(Ct)   log(Ct 1); is an i.i.d. process in this subsection.4 The representative
agent in the domestic economy (and the foreign economy) is sentimental and has a subjective
belief that is dierent from the data-generating process observed by an econometrician.
Under economic agents' subjective belief, the mean growth rate of the economy, st, is time-
4This assumption is innocuous and is relaxed in Section 3.4.
8varying and the dynamics of consumption growth are as follows:
gt+1 = g + st + g^ g;t+1 (5)
st+1 = sst + ss;t+1; (6)
where ^ g;t and s;t are i.i.d. standard joint normal under the economic agent's belief. A
nonzero correlation between ^ g;t and s;t is allowed, and joint normality of the shocks are
assumed throughout the paper. Since consumption is truly drawn from a distribution with
a constant mean, we can interpret st as investor sentiment. When st is positive (negative),
the agent is optimistic (pessimistic).
Formally, we assume that under the econometrician's view (i.e, the objective belief or the
data-generating process), the dynamics for (gt;st) are given by
gt+1 = g + gg;t+1 (7)
st+1 = sst + ss;t+1; (8)
where g;t and s;t are i.i.d. standard normal under the data-generating process.5 Although
consumption growth is i.i.d. under the data-generating process, sentiment still aects asset
prices since equilibrium is determined by investors' beliefs. That is, the equilibrium prices
are determined by the consumption dynamics given by equations (5) and (6). On the other
hand, empirical tests depend on the true data-generating process. The dierence between
the subjective belief and the data-generating process is the key for the econometrician to
obtain a negative UIP coecient when analyzing the data. In a model with endogenous
5Strictly speaking, we need to show that there exist objective and subjective probability beliefs such that
the dynamics of consumption follow those given here under these two probability measures. These are purely
technical requirements, and the proof is just a simple application of the Girsanov theorem. The learning
model in the appendix provides such an example.
9investor sentiment (e.g., the model in the appendix), sentiment is likely to increase when the
realized endowment is high. To capture this eect, we allow a nonzero correlation between
g;t and s;t; denoted as gs.
The above specication on consumption and sentiment represents the main departure
from rational expectation models and hence deserves further discussion. Time-varying
misperception on the growth rate (i.e., sentiment) could be derived from a learning model
with overcondence. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and
Xiong and Yan (2010) elegantly provide such models. More importantly, in the appendix
we provide an exchange rate model based on learning with overcondence, and we show
that such a mean-reverting sentiment process can be generated endogenously.6 Nonetheless,
we specify an exogenous sentiment process in our main text because modeling the origin
of sentiment does not add economic insights for the purpose of this study, while it does
complicate the analysis. Our overall approach is to keep the model as simple as possible
while retaining the key ingredients needed to generate the failure of the UIP condition.
Moreover, we show in the appendix that all the results remain when the sentiment process is
modeled endogenously. We therefore believe that a model with exogenous sentiment is more
eective in highlighting the role of sentiment in currency markets.
To complete the model, we follow Bansal and Yaron (2004) by specifying the investors'
preferences over uncertain consumption stream Ct as the Epstein-Zin recursive utility



















where ^ Et () is the expectation under economic agents' subjective belief conditional on
6Empirically, the sentiment data from Baker and Wurgler (2006) also suggest that the sentiment process
is mean-reverting. Thus, we specify the sentiment process as an AR(1) in equation (6).
10information available up to time t, the parameter 0 <  < 1 is the time discount factor,

  0 is the risk-aversion parameter,    0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution





: When risk aversion is larger than the reciprocal of IES, agents
prefer early resolution of uncertainty of the consumption path (e.g., Kocherlakota (1990)).
Hence, these preferences allow for agents' preference for the timing of the resolution of
uncertainty. To generate a negative UIP coecient, we need a preference for early resolution
of uncertainty. However, unlike long-run risk models, we do not impose IES   > 1. Whether
IES is below or above one has been the subject of a long-lasting debate in the literature.
However, it is more conventional to assume a preference for early resolution of uncertainty.
3.2. The Stochastic Discount Factor
As shown in Epstein and Zin (1989), the logarithm of the intertemporal marginal rate of
substitution (IMRS) is given by
mt+1  log(Mt+1) = log  

 
gt+1 + (   1)ra;t+1; (10)
where ra;t+1 is the logarithm of the gross return on an asset that delivers aggregate
consumption as its dividends each period. For any continuous return rt+1 = log(Rt+1);
including the one on the consumption claim,
^ Et [exp(mt+1 + rt+1)] = 1: (11)
As we show below, with log-linear approximation, the return on wealth can be solved
explicitly, and hence the IMRS can be obtained explicitly as well.
113.3. The Foreign Exchange Market
A foreign country is introduced into the model. The setup is similar to that used in
Colacito and Croce (2011). For tractability, complete symmetry is imposed, and all the
model parameters are identical across countries. Furthermore, we assume that the agents at
home and abroad share the same belief, although their beliefs could be wrong. Thus, when
domestic sentiment is high, it means that all the representative agents are homogeneously
optimistic about the U.S. economy.
Again, under a frictionless complete market, the (log) exchange rate et is linked to
domestic and foreign discount factors mt and m
t by the following equation:
et+1   et = mt+1   m

t+1: (12)
Therefore, to solve for the exchange rate, we follow the standard argument in the long-run
risk literature (e.g, Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Colacito and Croce (2011)), and we rst
compute the return on wealth, ra;t+1; in the pricing kernel equation (10). It follows from
Campbell-Shiller log-linear approximation that
ra;t+1  0 + 1zt+1   zt + gt+1: (13)
We further approximate the price consumption ratio as a linear function of the state variable
st. That is,
zt  A0 + A1st; (14)
where A0 and A1 are constants. Substituting equations (13) and (14) back into Euler equation




12Furthermore, substituting equations (13) and (14) back into equation (10) gives the









st + 1 (   1)A1ss;t+1 + C0; (15)
where C0 is a constant. Given the above expression for the pricing kernel, we can calculate








st + C1; (16)










Here, we have imposed complete symmetry across countries. If we relax this assumption,
r
f;t   rf;t = 1
 2s
t   1
 1st, where  1 and  2 are the IES for the domestic and foreign agent,
respectively. Thus, we obtain the rst testable prediction from our model.
Prediction 1 Interest rate dierentials are negatively associated with domestic investor
sentiment st and positively associated with foreign investor sentiment s
t.
Furthermore, it follows from equations (12) and (15) that the solution to changes in
exchange rates is given by




















Notice that under the data-generating process, both "t+1, and "






= Et (gt+1) = g. Here, Et () is the expectation under the econometrician's view
13(i.e., the objective belief). Therefore, taking the conditional expectation under the data-
generating process yields







 (st   s

t): (19)
When investors prefer earlier resolution of consumption uncertainty (i.e., 
   1
  > 0), the
econometrician detects a positive relation between domestic investor sentiment and the
expected changes in exchange rates. This leads to our second testable prediction from the
model.
Prediction 2 If 
 > 1
 , domestic investor sentiment st is positively associated with the
changes in the exchange rate, et+1   et. That is, in the data, high domestic sentiment
forecasts an appreciation of the domestic currency.
It is worthy of note that under economic agents' belief, we have
^ Et (et+1   et) =  
1
 




f;t   rf;t: (20)
Hence, when the sentiment about the domestic growth rate is high and all else equal,
economic agents expect an appreciation of the foreign currency. Further, economic agents
expect a UIP coecient of one. This result is the same with traditional asset pricing models.
The exchange rate has to re
ect the dierences in growth rates between two countries.
If agents in the model expect a high growth rate in the future, they also anticipate the
home currency to depreciate to re
ect the dierences in growth rates between two countries.
Nonetheless, when confronted with the historical data, the econometrician detects a positive
relation between sentiment and changes in exchange rates. More important, equation (20) is
consistent with the ndings in Frankel and Froot (1987, 1990b) that when ex-ante measures
14of expected exchange rate changes (based on survey data) instead of the ex post realizations
are used as the dependent variable in UIP regression, the UIP coecient is estimated to lie
in the vicinity of one.
Finally, combining equations (17) and (19), we obtain our key result for the UIP
regression:








We restate the result as the following key proposition.
Proposition 1 The UIP coecient is 1  
; which is always less than one and is negative
as long as investors prefers early resolution of uncertainty.
Proposition 1 is consistent with the empirical ndings of Fama (1984) and Engel (2011).
Therefore, this simple exchange rate model can reproduce the forward premium puzzle. We
explain the model intuition below. Due to a complete market, the exchange rate (the foreign
price of each home consumption unit) equalizes the marginal utility of consumption of the
home and foreign agents, and hence it is positively related to the home agent's marginal
utility of consumption. Under recursive preferences, the real exchange rate therefore has to
adjust to re
ect dierences in both current and future relative consumption across countries.
As we argued in the introduction, when domestic sentiment is high today, a high domestic
growth rate is anticipated by economic agents. Hence, from economic agents' point of
view, the home currency is expected to depreciate in the future to re
ect the dierence
in consumption across two countries (e.g., equation (20)). Moreover, equation (20) implies
that the magnitude of this anticipated depreciation depends on the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES). The easier it is to substitute consumption intertemporally, the less the
anticipated depreciation.
15However, to an econometrician who analyzes the historical data, there is another counter
eect. The econometrician anticipates that the economic agent at home will receive a lower-
than-expected endowment tomorrow, thus raising the marginal utility of consumption next
period. Through this eect, the econometrician expects the home currency to appreciate.
The magnitude of this appreciation depends on the agent's risk aversion since risk aversion
determines the reduction in the marginal utility due to the lower-than-expected realized
consumption endowment (e.g., equation (15)). Consequently, the econometrician is likely
to observe a smaller depreciation or even an appreciation of home currency in the future.
In particular, when risk aversion is greater than the inverse of IES, the second eect
dominates and high domestic sentiment predicts an appreciation of home currency from
the econometrician's point of view. At the same time, when domestic sentiment is high,
the domestic interest is also high, due to the home agent's incentive to borrow to reduce
the discrepancy between consumption today and in the future. Taken together, high interest
currency is expected to appreciate in the econometrician's view. These eects together result
in a negative coecient in UIP regressions.
It is worth emphasizing that the dierence of equation (20) and (21) implies that investors'
prediction error on exchange rate growth is positively correlated with the forward premium
(i.e. the interest rate dierential). This is consistent with the ndings in Froot and Frankel
(1989) and Frankel and Chinn (1993). For example, Froot and Frankel (1989) examine the
regression of expectation errors (based on survey data) on the forward premium. The authors
nd that the coecient on the forward premium is signicantly greater than zero, and this
nding is robust.
The failure of the UIP condition also implies predictable returns in currency markets. We
now turn to the eect of sentiment on the predictability of returns on foreign exchange. The
return on foreign exchange is dened as the excess return of a domestic investor who borrows
16at the domestic risk-free rate (in logs), rf;t, converts the funds into foreign currency, lends
at the foreign risk-free rate (in logs), r
f;t, and then converts his earnings back to domestic
currency. That is, the return on foreign exchange is just the return on a carry trade strategy.
Hence, in logs, the return on foreign exchange, rFX





f;t   rf;t + et   et+1. (22)
Taking equations (17), (19), and (22) together, we have that under the econometrician's








  (st   s

t): (23)
The above argument leads to the third testable prediction from our model.
Prediction 3 Returns on foreign exchange are negatively associated with domestic investor
sentiment st; and positively associated with foreign investor sentiment s
t.
















To highlight its importance, we state it as another proposition below, which is consistent
with the empirical evidence in Fama (1984).
Proposition 2 The regression coecient of returns on foreign exchanges on interest rate
7Notice that from the economic agents' perspective, the expected return on foreign exchange is a constant
(zero) and independent of st. This follows from equation (20) and the denition of the return of foreign
exchange.
17dierentials is given by 
  > 0.
Finally, the model also has implications for the role of investor sentiment for bond
yields and for returns on the consumption claim. Recall that the risk-free rate is given
by rf;t = C1 + 1
 st
8. As a result, the following key implication for the predictive ability of
investor sentiment for bond yield changes is obtained:
Et (rf;t+1   rf;t) =
1
 
(s   1)st: (25)
Furthermore, the expected excess return on the unobservable consumption claim is given by
Et (ra;t+1)   rf;t = C2   st; (26)
where C2 is an appropriate constant. This leads to the following prediction of the model.
Prediction 4 There is a negative relation between investor sentiment and future changes
in bond yields. Sentiment negatively predicts returns on the consumption claim.
In summary, our simple model can reproduce the forward premium puzzle. However, to
test whether our proposed mechanism is in the data, we need to test the refutable Predictions
1-4. In Section 4., we provide evidence in support of Predictions 1-4. As a nal note, we
want to emphasize again that one does not necessarily need to interpret our key variable,
st, as a investor sentiment bias. It simply represents the deviation of the economic agents'
perception from the econometrican's perception. For example, st could be a result of agents'
8This equation implies a positive relation between the real interest rate and investor sentiment. In the
data, the correlation between the realized real interest rate and investor sentiment is about 27%. Here, the
realized interest rate is dened as the dierence between the nominal interest rate and in
ation.
18rational learning on news shocks to technology or production, which is not observed by the
econometrician.
3.4. An Extension of the Model
To highlight the importance of investor sentiment, so far we have assumed that the expected
consumption growth rate is a constant under the objective measure, and hence sentiment

uctuations account for most of the movements for nancial variables. We by no means think
that sentiment alone can account for a large set of moments of international nancial and
macroeconomic variables. Other economic forces must also be at play. For example, Colacito
and Croce (2011) consider a version of international long-run risk model and show that the
model can help account for a large set of international asset-pricing puzzles. However, due to
the constant risk premium, their model cannot address the failure of UIP. In this section, we
extend the model in the previous section by introducing time-varying consumption growth
under the objective measure, as in Colacito and Croce (2011). We then use the sentiment-
augmented model to study the failure of UIP, which is the focus of our paper.
Under investors' belief, the domestic consumption growth dynamics can be assumed to
be given by
gt+1 = g + xt + st + g^ g;t+1
xt+1 = xxt + xx;t+1
st+1 = sst + ss;t+1;
where (g;t;x;t;s;t) is i.i.d. joint normal (under the agent's subjective belief) with mean
zero and variance one, and cross-correlations are allowed. Under the econometrician's view
19(i.e., the data-generating processes), however, the dynamics of consumption and sentiment
are given by
gt+1 = g + xt + gg;t+1
xt+1 = xxt + xx;t+1
st+1 = sst + ss;t+1:
All the shocks are i.i.d. standard normal over time, but cross-correlations are allowed. Similar
dynamics are assumed for foreign consumption. In this more general case, using a similar
argument as in previous subsection, it can be shown that the expected change in exchange
rates is given by















and the interest rate dierential (i.e., the one-period forward premium) is
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Therefore, the true expected consumption growth and the misperceived growth have opposite
predictive power for the change in the exchange rate. This prediction nicely highlights the
distinct role of the misperception in consumption growth and the true expected consumption
growth. We provide empirical support for this novel prediction in the next section. For
simplicity, assuming independence between xt and st under the objective belief, the regression
coecients of n-period changes in the exchange rate on the n-period forward premium (i.e.,





























With straightforward algebra, one can show the following proposition.






    1, the one-period UIP coecient 1 is negative.
In the appendix, we show that through learning with overcondence, x > s > 0
holds for the endogenous sentiment process.9 As an illustrative example,10 we simply set







    1) < 
  1. Then the conditions in the above proposition are satised,
and the long-horizon UIP coecients n are given by
Horizon (months) 1 3 12 24 48 60 120
UIP coecient -0.86 -0.63 0.09 0.51 0.77 0.82 0.89
Hence, the UIP condition holds better at longer horizons, which is consistent with the
empirical ndings in Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) and Meredith and Chinn (2004). In
particular, at longer horizons of ve and ten years, Chinn and Meredith (2004) nd much
less negative forward premium bias.
9This result is intuitive. Misperception is the dierence between the true expected growth rate and the
perceived expected growth rate. Hence, the persistence of the dierence process should be smaller than that
of the original processes.
10We perform a more serious calibration exercise in the Section 3.5..
213.5. Additional Implications for Correlations and Volatilities
Although the main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple sentiment-based explanation
for the forward premium puzzle, we also want to explore the model's ability to account
for other major puzzles in international markets. Since the model is originally proposed to
account for the failure of UIP, this serves as a natural "out-of-sample" test of the model.
Specically, we consider three stylized facts here. First, it is well documented that
consumption growth is smooth and poorly correlated across countries, whereas asset market
returns are volatile and highly correlated across countries. Second, it is also well known
that consumption growth dierentials and the exchange rate changes are poorly correlated
(e.g., the Backus-Smith (1993) puzzle). Third, more recently, Brandt et al. (2006) argue
that high equity premia imply highly volatile pricing kernels (about 50%). In addition,
consumption growth is poorly correlated across countries. Within a power utility setting,
this would suggest a low correlation between pricing kernels across countries. Together, it
implies that the volatility of exchange rates should be much larger than the 10  15% value
observed in the data (see equation (12)). In other words, pricing kernels should be much
more correlated than that suggested by consumption data, and hence quantities and prices
have dramatically dierent implications for the correlations between the pricing kernels.11
In an intriguing paper, Colacito and Croce (2011) cleverly break the link between the
correlation of consumption growth and the correlation of the pricing kernel by introducing
highly correlated long-run consumption. In their model, pricing kernels are mostly driven
by the small but persistent long-run consumption components, which are highly correlated
across countries. Thus, a high correlation between pricing kernels can be reconciled with a
11For our model with investor misperception, the exact Hansen-Jagannathan bound actually does not
apply. Hence, in theory the pricing kernels in our model do not need to be as volatile as the maximum
observed Sharpe ratio. Thus, the price-implied international correlation between the pricing kernels does
not need to be as high as in Brandt et al. (2006). This already makes the issue less puzzling.
22low consumption correlation. Their model can also reproduce many other stylized facts in
both macroeconomic and nancial variables, including the low cash 
ow correlations, but
high asset return correlations. Below we show that our simple sentiment-based model can
also help generate these patterns in the data. Thus, our model provides an alternative, yet
not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanation for the patterns observed in the data. One
advantage of our model is that the same mechanism can help reproduce the forward premium
puzzle and the low correlation between consumption growth dierentials and exchange rate
changes.
The mechanism of our model is very simple and similar in spirit to Colacito and Croce
(2011). Even if the realized consumption growth rates are only weakly correlated across
countries, the pricing kernels can still be highly correlated (see equation (15)), as long as
investor sentiment is highly correlated across countries. The high correlation between pricing
kernels also helps generate high asset return correlations across countries, despite low cash

ow correlations. Moreover, since both sentiment and consumption aect the movements in
exchange rates, the model can produce a low correlation between the observed consumption
growth dierentials and the exchange rate growth. In this sense, our model helps resolve the
Backus-Smith puzzle. Diering with Colacito and Croce (2011), even if the sentiment process
is volatile and persistent, the observed consumption growth still behaves like an i.i.d. process.
Although it is hard to identify the slow-moving predictable consumption component from the
consumption data, survey data do show that there is signicant variation on perceived growth
rates. For example, the Survey of Professional Forecasters data show that the perceived GDP
growth is almost as volatile as the realized GDP itself. Thus, the volatile perceived growth
rate can produce large long-run risk in the model, rasing the model's ability to match asset
pricing models.
In Table 1, we brie
y calibrate our model. Column 1 reports the results for a model with
23i.i.d. consumption growth and without investor sentiment (i.e., x = s = 0). The stock
market's dividend is a levered claim on consumption with leverage  = 2. In this case, the
pricing kernel is poorly correlated; the correlations between the stock market returns across
countries are very low; and the consumption growth dierentials and exchange rate growth
are perfectly correlated. Since the risk aversion is low, the equity premium is low, as is stock
market volatility. All of these results are well known. In column 2, we introduce investor
misperception into the calibration. We set the international correlation of sentiment to be
93%. A few important changes are noticed. First, since misperception is persistent, the
equity premium is now much larger and stock returns are also volatile due to the perceived
long-run risk. Second, the stock market correlation across countries is as high as 73:3%,
despite a negative dividend growth correlation. This is, of course, due to the high correlation
between the resulting pricing kernels, which is now about 91% . Third, the correlation
between consumption growth dierentials and exchange rate growth is no longer perfect.
Instead, it is only 52:2%. Here, the model is simulated at a monthly frequency. If we time
aggregate the observations to an annual frequency, this correlation is even lower, closer to
the counterpart in the data. Fourth, despite a large equity premium and a low consumption
correlation, the model does not produce excessive volatility in foreign exchange. This is due
to the large correlation of pricing kernels that resulted from the highly correlated sentiment.
In column 3, we shut down the investor sentiment channel and introduce a highly
correlated long-run risk component as in Colacito and Croce (2011). We also raise the risk
aversion and leverage to obtain a reasonable equity premium. Conrming their results, we
also nd that the model can successfully reproduce many stylized facts in the international
macro and nancial variables. However, there is one side eect of the highly correlated
long-run risk. The correlation between consumption growth dierentials and exchange rate
growth is excessively high. With almost perfect correlation between long-run consumption
24components across countries, virtually all of the exchange rate movements come from the
short-run consumption shocks. Moreover, most of the consumption movements are due to
short-run shocks since consumption growth is almost an i.i.d. process. Taken together, it
implies a very high correlation between consumption growth dierentials and exchange rate
growth. In our calibration, this correlation is almost perfect, and it is still more than 80%
after time aggregation to an annual frequency. Colacito and Croce (2008) show that by
relaxing the assumption of the complete home bias, this correlation can be reduced. Instead,
we show that introducing investor sentiment is an alternative mechanism for reducing this
correlation.
For completeness, we incorporate both "objective" long-run risk and misperception into
the model in the last column. As we can see, the sentiment-augmented model helps reduce
the correlation between foreign exchange growth and consumption growth dierentials. In
our calibration, the variation of sentiment is about 66  70% of the variation of the realized
consumption growth. This value seems a bit large, but it is consistent with the Survey of
Professional Forecasters and Livingston Forecast data, both available from the Philadelphia
FED. For example, the ratio of the forecasted growth volatility and realized growth volatility
ranges from 46% to 88%, depending on the survey data and the forecast horizons. Reducing
the volatility of sentiment and increasing risk aversion would increase the correlation of
foreign exchange growth and consumption growth dierentials, but would leave the rest of
the results almost intact. Finally, since 
  > 1 and (xt   x
t)=(st   s
t) < 
    1 in our
calibrations with misperception, the UIP coecients in those scenarios are negative.
Due to the short sample periods of the available data, it is very hard to identify long-run
consumption components using consumption data alone. Previous studies (e.g., Bansal et al.
(2009) and Colacito and Croce (2011)) therefore use nancial variables to help estimate the
long-run consumption component. Asset prices re
ect the misperceived consumption growth,
25whereas the realized consumption growth does not. Our model provides another justication
for looking at the nancial data to identify the long-run risk. More specically, with investor
misperception, we should not just use realized consumption growth to identify perceived
consumption growth. Instead, the price dividend ratio and the interest rate should contain
a direct measure of the perceived long-run risk. Thus, our model provides a natural account
for why estimation based on the prices and interest rates tends to support the long-run risk
model more strongly. In this sense, we view our model as an alternative interpretation of
the long-run risk model from a dierent angle, and hence our analysis complements that of
Colacito and Croce (2011). Alternatively, misperception provides a natural way to generate
long-run risk. Since the perceived growth rate can be substantially more volatile than the
true expected growth rate, our misperception-based model can produce large asset price
volatility with a low risk aversion coecient.
Of course, we do not claim that this simple model can quantitatively account for all
of the patterns observed in the data. Nonetheless, it is comforting to know that the same
mechanism in the model can help reproduce many stylized facts in the international markets
simultaneously. The next subsection further discusses the implication on carry trade. We
then proceed to the empirical test of the key predictions (Predictions 1-4) of the model.
3.6. The Carry Trade
So far, our discussion focuses mainly on the time-series implications of the two-country
model. We further discuss the cross-sectional dimension of the model in this subsection.
Formally, we would need extend the two-country model to an n-country model to discuss the
cross-sectional implications, which is beyond the scope of this study (see, e.g., Bakshi, Carr,
and Wu (2008)). Instead, we just treat the two countries in our model as a pair of countries
26in a potential n-country model, as in a majority of the current literature.
Proposition 2 predicts that an investor could earn abnormal excess returns by holding
the short term debt of countries with high short rates and shorting the short term bond
of countries with low short rates (i.e., the carry trade). However, it is worth noting that
the model implies that prots are available by trading based on transitory interest rate
dierentials, not by holding the short-term bond of a country that persistently has a higher
average interest rate. To see this, suppose that the average endowment growth rates, g
and 
g are dierent in domestic and foreign countries but the all other shocks are i.i.d., it
follows from a reformulation of equation (18) that the country with persistently low interest
rates (i.e., low average endowment growth rates) will on average appreciate. Thus, carry
trading is less protable. This is consistent with the empirical ndings that countries with
steadily higher interest rates have had steady currency depreciations (see, e.g., Table 2 below
or Cochrane (1999)). Therefore, to make carry trading more protable, one should focus on
the transitory interest rate dierentials. This implication is the same with the overcondence
model of Burnside et al. (2011).
The model implies that rational investors could earn prots through carry trade. Since we
have assumed that all investors are identically biased, similar to Burnside et at. (2011), they
do not engage in the carry trade to exploit the failure of UIP in equilibrium. If we were to
introduce rational investors into the model, we conjecture that the eect of misperception on
UIP would be reduced but not eliminated. This is because sentiment uncertainty represents
a systematic risk. Even if prices re
ect incorrect expectations, there is no risk-free arbitrage
opportunity for rational investors (see, e.g., De Long et al. (1990)). Thus, the risk inherent in
carry trades limits the arbitrage activities by risk averse rational investors. Indeed, in many
behavioral models, asset prices re
ect the beliefs of both rational and irrational investors,
with weights depending on the risk bearing capacities of the dierent group (see, e.g., De
27Long et al. (1990), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001), and Dumas, Kurshev,
and Uppal (2009)). In this sense, our representative agent model can be viewed as a reduced-
form of the heterogeneous agent model.
4. Empirical Tests
In this section, we rst introduce notation for the predictive variables.We then discuss the
empirical design and data used in the analysis and present summary statistics. Empirical
results follow. The majority of our analysis is under real terms. However, our results also
hold if nominal exchange rates are used. Those results are omitted for brevity.
4.1. Denition of Variables
First, dene changes in spot rates as
et = et   et 1: (30)
In the empirical test that follows, we follow Engel and West (2005) and choose a 3-month
forward rate. It is one of the most popular and easily available forward rates for all of the
industrial countries during the period 1973-2009. The 3-month forward exchange rate Ft is
observed at the end of month t for a delivery at the end of month t + 3. Let ft = log(Ft).
The 3-month forward premium is dened as
fpt = ft   et: (31)
28By covered interest parity, fpt equals the dierence between the 3-month risk-free rate
(from the end of month t to the end of month t + 3) in the foreign country at the end of
month t and the 3-month domestic risk-free rate the end of month t. The return on foreign
exchange is therefore given by
r
FX
t+3 = ft   et+3: (32)
Finally, sentiment st is dened as the sentiment measure by Baker and Wurgler (2006). We
also measure the true expected growth rate, xt, as the trailing average of the past 3-year
consumption growth rates as in Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005).
4.2. Empirical Design
The empirical specications are standard long-horizon predictive regressions (e.g., Fama and
French (1988) and Hodrick (1992)). All variables are observed monthly. The future changes
in spot rates and returns on foreign exchange rates are regressed onto investor sentiment, st.
Therefore, the dependent variable is either the log change in foreign exchange rate, et+h et,
with dierent horizons or the 3-month log return on foreign exchange, rFX
t+3. The independent
variables are investor sentiment, st; or other predictive variables.
For example, to examine the ability of investor sentiment to predict changes in spot rates,
the main regression is
et+h   et = h + sst + t;t+h: (33)
The error term t;t+h is an element of the time t+h, and is autocorrelated due to overlapping
observations when the forecast horizon, h, is greater than one. Newey-West (1987) standard
errors are used to adjust for this autocorrelation and potential heteroscedasticity. The t-
statistics resulting from the adjustment test the null hypothesis that a given slope coecient
29equals zero.
4.3. Data
To test our model predictions, we need a proxy for investor misperception (i.e., sentiment).
The misperception proxy is usually hard to obtain since it typically requires measures of
"true" expected growth and "perceived" growth, both of which are dicult to estimate.
We nd that Baker and Wurgler's (2006) sentiment index serves as a good proxy for
misperception since it is orthogonalized against a set of fundamental variables. The monthly
sentiment index spans over 42 years, from July 1965 to December 2007. Baker and Wurgler
(2006) form their composite sentiment index by taking the rst principal component of six
measures of investor sentiment. The principal component analysis lters out idiosyncratic
noise in the six measures and captures their common component. The six measures are the
closed-end fund discount, the number and the rst-day returns of IPOs, NYSE turnover,
the equity share in total new issues, and the dividend premium. The individual measures
are orthogonalized against industrial production, consumption growth, and NBER recession
indicators before the principal component analysis is performed.
The data set on foreign exchange includes monthly spot and 3-month forward exchange
rates between the U.S. dollar and currencies in 19 industrial countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.
The data sample is between 1973m1 and 2008m12 for most countries and may vary in some
countries due to data availability. Legacy exchange rates derived by Haver Analytics are
used for currencies of Euro-area member countries after they switched to the euro. Again,
we choose the 3-month forward rate because it is one of the most popular rates used in the
30literature (e.g., Engel and West (2005)) and is easily available for all the industrial countries
during the period 1973-2009.
Monthly CPI data for these 19 countries and the United States over 1973m1 to 2008m12
are obtained from the IMF. Annual real consumption per capita from 1970 to 2007 is obtained
from the OECD. Quarterly real U.S. consumption per capita comes from the BEA. Finally,
some argue that the nature of the 
exible exchange rate system during our sample period is
not well understood by market participants in the early 1970s (see, e.g., Hansen and Hodrick
(1980)). We therefore discard the rst two years of data and start our sample from 1975m1.
Nonetheless, our results are virtually the same even if we include the rst two years of early
data.
Spot exchange rates come from the Federal Reserve, and 3-month forward exchange
rates come from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The spot and forward exchange
rates are used to calculate interest rate dierentials between the U.S. dollar and other
currencies. For several countries, some of the forward exchange rates are missing in the
IFS. In these cases, the forward rate is obtained from Bloomberg or is calculated from the
3-month interest rate obtained from the G-10 data set. The choice of data source is dictated
by data availability. Finally, we obtain monthly prices for 1- to 5-year zero-coupon bonds
from June 1952 to December 2008 from CRSP.
4.4. Summary Statistics
Because the absolute magnitude of the Baker and Wurgler sentiment index has no particular
meaning, we standardize the index to mean zero and unit standard deviation. The monthly
sentiment series is quite persistent with annualized autocorrelation of 78%, whereas the
autocorrelation calculated from Baker and Wurgler (2006) annual sentiment series is 68%.
31The sentiment index is plotted in Figure 1. It appears to capture most anecdotal accounts
of 
uctuations in sentiment. Immediately after the 1961 crash of growth stocks, investor
sentiment was low but rose to a subsequent peak in the 1968 and 1969 \electronics bubble."
Sentiment fell again by the mid-1970s, but it picked up and reached a peak in the \biotech
bubble" of the early 1980s. In the late 1980s, sentiment dropped but rose again in the early
1990s, reaching its most recent peak during the \internet bubble."
To facilitate comparison with prior literature, we report summary statistics for exchange
rates in nominal terms. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the monthly change in spot
rate (et). The means and standard deviations of variables are given in percentages. The
volatility of the monthly change in spot rate is about 3% for most of the sample countries,
which is consistent with previous studies. The autocorrelation of the change in spot rate is
very low, which suggests that spot rates behave like a random walk.
Table 2 shows that the currencies of Japan, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Germany,
and the Netherlands appreciate the most against the U.S. dollar from 1973m1 to 2007m12.
Precisely these countries (except Denmark) have lower interest rates than the United States
during this period (or equivalently, a negative forward premium). This implies that the
expectation hypothesis in currency markets seems to hold on average or in the long run. On
the other hand, Table 2 also indicates that the countries with a high average interest rate also
yield a slightly higher return on foreign exchange. This suggests that sorting on the interest
rate dierential could yield a signicant spread (e.g., Lustig and Verdelhan (2007)). The
volatility of returns on foreign exchange is much more volatile than the forward premium,
consistent with the nding in Fama (1984).
324.5. Main Empirical Evidence
In the model, all the results pertain to real exchange rates and real interest rates. However, a
majority of prior empirical studies use nominal rates. In the empirical tests below, we focus
on real terms using nominal exchange rates as robustness checks. We want to emphasize
that all of our empirical results are robust to both real and nominal exchange rates. Finally,
because a majority of foreign exchange transactions involve U.S. dollars (about 86%), the
U.S. dollar is used as the domestic currency throughout the paper.
As noted in Section 3., the real interest rate dierential (i.e. the forward premium)
is positively related to domestic consumption volatility, negatively related to the domestic
surplus ratio, and negatively related to domestic sentiment. Since we do not have a long
sample of the real interest rate, we cannot test Prediction 1 directly. Nonetheless, we use
nominal rates to provide some suggestive evidence. The last column of Table 2 shows support
for this prediction. The correlation between the nominal forward premium and domestic
sentiment is negative for all of the 19 industrial countries, consistent with Prediction 1 in
Section 3..
According to Prediction 2, changes in real exchange rates are positively related to
domestic sentiment. The evidence in Table 3 is consistent with this prediction. Note that, to
match the 3-month forward rate, here we focus on 3-month changes in exchange rates rather
than 1-month changes. In untabulated results, we show that the results are very similar when
we use one-month changes or 1-year changes in exchange rates, although the R2 is bigger
in longer horizon regressions. The results also remain similar if we use nominal exchange
rates. These results, omitted for brevity, are available upon request. Finally, according to
Prediction 3, returns on foreign exchange are negatively related to domestic sentiment. The
results from Table 3 conrm this prediction as well. The coecients for all the 19 countries
33have the correct sign, and more than two thirds of them are statistically signicant.
Because sentiment data are not available for all 19 industrial countries, the analysis so
far is based on U.S. investor sentiment only. This does not pose much of an issue for the
sentiment-based explanation since adding foreign investor sentiment to the right-hand side of
the above regressions is likely to strengthen the results. The reason for this is the following.
Given a likely positive correlation of investor sentiment across countries, a standard result
from the omitted variable regression suggests that the regression coecient of exchange rate
changes on domestic sentiment will increase if foreign investor sentiment is included in the
regression. Thus, including foreign sentiment is likely to strengthen our empirical results.
Indeed, controlling for Baker, Wurgler, and Yuan's (2009) sentiment for Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, and UK,12 we still nd that the t-statistics for sentiment in regressions
of returns on foreign exchange on sentiment are -2.285, -2.208, -2.986, -0.268 and -0.306 for
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and UK, respectively. The negative sign is consistent with
our Prediction 3.
Previous studies have proposed alternative models to reproduce the failure of UIP.
Typically, these explanations work in the following manner. The interest rate dierential
is approximately a linear function of some state variable (e.g., investor sentiment in our
model or surplus ratios in habit models), and the expected change in exchange rates and
the expected return on foreign exchange are also approximately a linear function of the
same state variable. If the coecients on the interest rate dierential and on the expected
change in exchange rates are opposite, then the model yields a negative coecient in the
UIP regression. However, these models operate through dierent mechanisms and constitute
12Sentiment data for Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and UK are available from Baker, Wurgler, and
Yuan (2009). However, there are only 16 annual observations from 1980-2005. Moreover, not all the original
six individual components in Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index are available for these countries to
construct the principal component.
34fundamentally dierent views of the sources and the pricing of risk. Thus, it is particularly
important to test the underlying model-implied relations between the state variables in
the model and the exchange rate growth or returns on foreign exchange. The supportive
evidence for Prediction 1-3 indicates that the misperception is an empirically relevant channel
in explaining the forward premium puzzle. In untabulated analysis, we rst construct
measures of the surplus ratio and consumption volatility. We then empirically compare
our misperception-based explanation with the explanations based on habit-formation (e.g.,
Verdelhan (2010)) and long-run risk (e.g., Bansal and Shaliastovich (2009)). The results,
omitted for brevity and available upon request, seem to suggest that the misperception
channel is at least as empirically relevant as the habit channel in the habit-formation model
and the stochastic consumption volatility channel in the long-run risk model.
4.6. The Distinct Role of xt and st
The evidence in the previous subsection provides support for the key channels in the
sentiment-based explanation. In this subsection, we want to highlight the distinct role of
the the objective growth rate (i.e., xt) and the "misperceived" growth rate (i.e., sentiment)
on exchange rate dynamics. The extended model in Section 3.4. shows that although both
xt and st are positively related to the interest rate, they have opposite power in predicting
subsequent exchange rate changes.
To test this prediction, we rst construct the true expected growth rate, xt, as the trailing
average of past 3-year consumption growth rates as in Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005).
Then we regress changes in exchange rates onto both investor sentiment (i.e., st) and expected
consumption growth (i.e., xt). Consistent with this prediction, Table 4 shows that indeed
sentiment is positively related to changes in exchange rates, whereas the true expected growth
35rate is negatively related to changes in exchange rates. These results thus highlight the role
of misperception in accounting for the negative UIP coecient. The true expected growth
rate goes the wrong way by producing a positive UIP coecient. Since both predictors st
and xt are persistent, like the regression of returns on the price dividend ratio, it might be
easier to identify their predictive power at long horizons. We therefore report regression
results for 1-month, 3-month, and 1-year changes in exchange rates. The results are usually
slightly more signicant, and the R2s are larger for long horizon regressions, consistent with
the traditional regression of returns on the dividend yield. Finally, all the results are similar
if we use nominal exchange rates instead.
In untabulated analysis, we nd that in a regression in which the true expected growth
rate, xt, is the only predictor, only two out of the 19 regressions have a signicantly negative
sign for xt. Thus, controlling for the misperceived growth, st, substantially improves the
predictive power of xt. In sum, this subsection documents the robust empirical fact that
investor sentiment positively predicts changes in future spot rates, whereas the opposite
holds for the true expected growth rate. The predictive power of investor sentiment is very
robust across the 19 industrial countries.
4.7. Forecasting Returns on Foreign Exchange by Sentiment
The forward premium predicts future returns on foreign exchange (e.g., Fama (1984), Hansen
and Hodrick (1980)). The popular carry trade in practice is based on this idea as well.
Prediction 3 states that investor sentiment serves as a contrarian predictor of returns on
foreign exchange.13 This subsection empirically examines whether investor sentiment can
predict returns on foreign exchange by controlling for the forward premium, the most well-
13Our model is written in real terms. But the expected returns on foreign exchange are equivalent when
dened in terms of real or nominal terms (see, e.g., equation (1) and (2) in Engel (2011)).
36known predictor for returns on foreign exchange.
In Table 5, returns on foreign exchange are rst regressed on the 3-month forward
premium. This table conrms the nding from previous studies on the predictive ability of
the forward premium. The high values of Newey-West t-statistics indicate that the forward
premium is indeed a signicant predictor of returns on foreign exchange. In the second
predictive regression, investor sentiment, st, is also included in the regression. The results
show that investor sentiment is a statistically signicant predictor of returns on foreign
exchange. Further, the economic signicance of the predictability is rather large. A one-
standard-deviation increase in investor sentiment is associated with a decrease in annualized
future returns on foreign exchange of about 6% on average.
In addition, the interaction between the forward premium and investor sentiment is
generally positive and signicant for 8 out of 19 countries. This indicates that the forward
premium has stronger predictive power for returns on foreign exchange when sentiment is
high. This is probably because when sentiment is high, sentiment traders exert greater
in
uence. Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009) document that individual investors, the
primary candidates for sentiment traders, check their portfolios more frequently and trade
their stocks more aggressively during market run-ups. When sentiment is low, however, more
rational investors occupy the market because, as Barber and Odean (2008) show, pessimistic
investors stay out of market due to their reluctance to take short positions. Hence, the
forward rate is closer to being an unbiased predictor for the future spot rate. Out of the 19
industrial countries, the adjusted R2 more than doubles for 11 countries. For example, the
forward premium only has weak power to predict returns on the Sweden krona with an R2 of
2%. However, when investor sentiment and other predictors are included in the regression,
the R2 increases to 11% and the Newey-West adjusted t-statistic for investor sentiment is
 4:97.
37Taken together, the empirical evidence indicates that investor sentiment contains
information about foreign exchange rates that is not captured by the forward premium.
4.8. Additional Evidence from Bond Markets
This section presents empirical evidence on the predictive ability of investor sentiment on
bond yield changes (i.e., Prediction 4). It serves as an additional robustness check on the
model's prediction.
Fama and Bliss (1987) run the following regression to test the expectation hypothesis:
rf;t+n 1   rf;t =  + (f
(n)
t   rf;t) + et+n 1;
where rf;t is the 1-period bond yield (in logs) from time t to t+1 and f
(n)
t is the time t
log forward rate between periods t+n-1 and t+n. The expectation hypothesis implies that
 = 1. That is, future yields move one-for-one with forward-spot spreads. The forward-
spot spread is also referred to as the Fama-Bliss factor or FB factor. Fama and Bliss (1987)
regress each excess return against the same-maturity forward-spot spread and provide classic
evidence against the expectation hypothesis in long-term bonds.
Panel A of Table 6 reports summary statistics for a zero-coupon bond at dierent
maturities. On average, the yield is upward sloping, and the volatility of the long-term
yield is slightly lower. The yields for all maturities are so persistent that they almost appear
as a random walk. Panel B of Table 6 repeats the classical Fama-Bliss regression with
updated data. As in Fama and Bliss (1987), Panel B conrms that the forward-spot spread
predicts excess bond returns.
38Panel C of Table 6 shows that investor sentiment signicantly predicts yield changes. In
particular, sentiment triples the R2 for all maturities compared with the case in which the
forward-spot rate is the only predictor. This is consistent with Prediction 4. For the 5-year
yield change, the R2 reaches as high as 41%. In addition, the interaction between sentiment
and the forward-spot spread is signicant in the long run and the coecient is negative. This
indicates that the forward-spot spread predicts a higher (and closer to one-to-one) change in
future yields when sentiment is lower. Nonetheless, our current model can not account for
the failure of the expectation hypothesis. It might be fruitful in future research to further
explore the role of investor sentiment on the failure of the expectation hypothesis. Finally,
Yuan (2008) shows that the Baker and Wurgler (2006) sentiment index has strong negative
power in predicting future excess market returns, consistent with Prediction 4.
In sum, our results suggest that investor sentiment plays an important role not only in
the stock market but also in two other major markets, the bond market and the foreign
exchange market.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a sentiment-based model that can account for the forward premium
puzzle. In addition, the model also helps reproduce many observed patterns in the
international markets, such as the low correlation between consumption growth dierentials
and exchange rate changes. We show that sentiment induced long-run risk is particularly
useful in reproducing many key asset pricing moments. This observation could be applied
to resolve other puzzles in asset markets in future research. Moreover, we also provide
evidence in support of the key mechanism in the model. Our empirical evidence suggests
that investor sentiment has substantial predictive power for both the currency and the bond
39markets. Thus, this study indicates that investor sentiment seems to be a pervasive predictor
in various asset markets and provides out-of-sample support for the important role of investor
sentiment in the stock market noted by previous studies (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006)).
The evidence of expectation-driven 
uctuations in the currency market has policy
implications. Exchange rate movements can change the relative prices of imports and exports
when prices are xed in the exporter's currency in the short run. A major benet of exchange
rate 
exibility is that it facilitates adjustment of the relative price in response to a country-
specic real shock. However, as argued by Devereux and Engel (2007), if exchange rate
movements are mainly driven by changes in expectations rather than by current demand
and supply conditions in the goods market, exchange rate 
uctuations may cause price
distortions in the goods market rather than facilitate price adjustments. This is especially
true if exchange rates are driven by irrational changes in expectations as documented in this
paper.
40Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to show that a model in the spirit of Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003), Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and Xiong and Yan (2010) can generate
endogenously a sentiment process that is similar to the one we specied exogenously in
Section 2. Due to our assumption of the complete home bias and complete markets, we can
analyze each country separately, then determine the exchange rate by linking the two pricing
kernels. We therefore only consider the home country below.
In the home country, we assume that the true data-generating process for the endowment
is as follows:
gt+1 = xt + gg;t+1
xt = xxt 1 + xx;t.
Because the agent does not observe the true expected growth rate xt, he has to estimate it
from the historical data. In addition to consumption growth gt, the agent observes a public
signal
t = ;t.
We assume that (g;t;x;t;;t) are i.i.d. standard normal and mutually independent. However,
due to overcondence, the representative agent believes that ;t is correlated to x;t and
believes that t has the following dynamics, with  2 (0;1) as the correlation parameter
measuring overcondence:
t = x;t +
p
1   2;t.
Let us dene at  ^ Et (xt); and Pt = ^ Vart (xt), where ^ Et () and ^ Vart (xt) denote the mean
and variance operators under the agent's information set up to time t, respectively. Then,
we can dene st as
st  at   xt; (34)
which can be interpreted as investor sentiment as before since st measures the optimism
(pessimism) on the growth rate of the endowment. By a standard application of the Kalman














41At the steady state, we have



























g ^ P (35)
The Kalman lter also implies that the dynamics for at are given by









Hence, for the the agent, the dynamics of consumption are
gt+1 = g + at + (gt+1   g   at)
at = xat 1 + K1 (gt   g   at 1) + K2t
The sentiment (misperception) process st has the following mean-reverting feature:
st = at   xt = sst 1 + K1gg;t + K2t   xx;t; (36)
where the persistence parameter is s  x   K1 < x. Hence, the endogenous sentiment

























. Now we can solve the model the same way as before by using
at as the state variable. The logarithm of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution
(IMRS) is given by
mt+1  log(Mt+1) = log  

 
gt+1 + (   1)ra;t+1; (38)
where ra;t+1 is the logarithm of the gross return on an asset that delivers aggregate
consumption as its dividends each period. For any continuous return rt+1 = log(Rt+1);
42including the one on the consumption claim,
^ Et [exp(mt+1 + rt+1)] = 1: (39)
Plugging in the Campbell-Shiller log-linear approximation, ra;t+1  0 + 1zt+1   zt + gt+1;
and the log-linear approximation on the price dividend ratio, zt  A0 +A1at; into the above
Euler equation, we can solve for constants A 0 and A1. In particular, we have A1 =
1 1= 
1 1x,
the same as before. Furthermore, substituting the Campbell-Shiller log-linear approximation









at + 1 (   1)A1 [K1 (gt+1   g   at) + K2t+1] + Cm; (40)
where the constant Cm is a properly dened constant.
Given the pricing kernel, the risk-free rate is determined by the agent's subjective belief








at + C1; (41)










Following from equation (40), we can write down the solution to the changes in exchange
rates as follows (due to complete markets):
















t) + (   1)A11

 













Let Et () be the expectation under the econometrician's view (i.e., the objective belief).
Notice that under the data-generating process, both t+1, and 






= Et (gt+1) = xt. Therefore, taking the conditional expectation under the data-
generating process yields
















43From equation (42) and (43), we can solve for the UIP coecient, and it is given by























































^ P + 1
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^ P + 1   2
x
When  = 1 (i.e., completely overcondent), we have ^ P = 0: Then we have
UIP = 1    
; (45)
which is the same as before, and the UIP coecient is negative as long as the agent prefers
an early resolution of uncertainty. When the international correlation is zero, we have






























































We can show that UIP is decreasing in overcondence parameter . In typical numerical
examples, we nd that as long as  is larger than 0:3, UIP is small or negative (results
available upon request). The above results suggest that when the overcondence bias is not
too small, an econometrician tends to nd a UIP coecient less than one or even negative
in the data. Hence, in this appendix, we provide a simple model with endogenous sentiment,
and we show that the results are similar in the model with exogenous sentiment. However,
the intuition in the model with exogenous sentiment is more straightforward.
44Figure 1: U.S. Investor Sentiment Index
The investor sentiment index is from 1965:07 to 2007:12. The sentiment index is the rst principal
component of six measures. The six measures are the closed-end fund discount, the NYSE share
turnover, the number of and average of rst-day returns on initial public oerings (IPOs), the
equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium. To control for macro conditions, the six
raw sentiment measures are regressed on the growth of industrial production, the growth of durable
consumption, the growth of nondurable consumption, the growth of service consumption, the growth
of employment, and a dummy variable for National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recessions.


















This table reports the key moments of international markets for our symmetric calibration. The model is
calibrated at a monthly frequency. The dividend growth is specied as gd;t+1 = d+(xt+st)+d^ d;t+1 under
agents' perception and ^ d;t is i.i.d. normal under agents' perception. However, under the data-generating
process, gd;t+1 = d+xt+dd;t+1, where the data-generating process for d;t is i.i.d. normal. The following
parameters are xed through all calibrations: g = 0:0015, d = 0:0007, g = 0:006, d = 0:027, x = 0:987,
s = 0:965,  = 0:998, (s;
s) = 0:930, (x;
x) = 0:999, (g;
g) = 0:3, (d;
d) =  0:1, and all the
unspecied correlations are set to zero.
Risk aversion 
 2.750 2.750 5.750 2.750
IES   2.500 2.500 2.500 2.500
s 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.132
x 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.024
Leverage () 2.000 2.000 3.000 2.000
Correlation b/t log pricing kernel: (mt;m
t) 0.301 0.907 0.936 0.922
Volatility of FX growth (et+1) 0.068 0.129 0.141 0.129
AC(1) of FX growth (et+1;et) -0.001 -0.012 -0.001 -0.012
(g
t+1   gt+1;et+1) 1.000 0.522 0.999 0.523
Average price-dividend ratio 4.033 3.118 2.903 3.020
Volatility of price-dividend ratio (%) 0.000 20.876 27.755 25.034
Mean excess stock return (%) -0.455 3.372 4.429 4.135
Volatility of excess stock return (%) 9.358 21.383 18.259 22.663
Sharpe ratio of the stock market -0.049 0.158 0.243 0.182
Average interest rate E(rf) (%) 3.048 1.962 2.172 1.761
Volatility of interest rate (rf) (%) 0.000 0.697 0.259 0.727
Interest rate correlation (rf;r
f) 1.000 0.929 1.000 0.935
Correlation b/t excess market returns -0.099 0.733 0.711 0.763
Correlation b/t consumption growth (g;g) 0.301 0.301 0.363 0.342
Volatility of consumption growth (%) 2.079 2.079 2.177 2.142
Correlation b/t dividend growth (gd;g
d) -0.099 -0.099 -0.054 -0.086
Volatility of dividend growth (%) 9.358 9.358 9.555 9.414
Volatility of pricing kernel 0.057 0.300 0.396 0.327
Ratio of var(s)/var(g) 0.000 0.702 0.000 0.661

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































47Table 3: Forecasting Exchange Rate Changes and Returns on Foreign Exchange
by Sentiment
This table reports results from the monthly overlapping predictive regression of 3-month changes in real
exchange rates and 3-month returns on foreign exchange on investor sentiment, st, respectively. The sample
is monthly from 1973m1 to 2007m12 during which investor sentiment data are available.  is the coecient of
the corresponding regression. Similarly, t is the t-statistic, and R2 is the adjusted r-squared for the predictive
regression. The Newey-West standard error is used to adjust for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in
error terms. The coecient  for sentiment is in percentage.
(et+3   et) on st (rFX
t+3) on st
Country (st) t(st) R2 (st) t(st) R2
Australia 0.75 2.41 0.02 -1.93 -3.98 0.07
Canada 0.10 0.48 -0.00 -0.42 -1.72 0.01
Denmark 1.02 2.36 0.03 -1.39 -3.14 0.05
Japan 1.02 2.33 0.02 -1.39 -3.14 0.04
New Zealand 0.85 1.87 0.02 -1.38 -2.27 0.04
Norway 0.67 1.67 0.01 -0.98 -2.32 0.03
Sweden 1.09 2.44 0.03 -1.40 -2.99 0.05
Swiss 1.28 2.01 0.02 -1.38 -2.45 0.04
U.K. 0.92 2.38 0.03 -0.91 -1.51 0.02
Austria 1.06 2.51 0.03 -1.47 -2.75 0.05
Belgium 1.28 2.75 0.04 -1.42 -2.64 0.05
Finland 0.61 1.56 0.01 -1.28 -2.96 0.04
France 1.01 2.07 0.03 -1.15 -1.95 0.03
Germany 1.44 2.49 0.03 -1.31 -2.51 0.04
Ireland 0.70 1.43 0.01 -1.09 -1.27 0.01
Italy 0.56 1.00 0.01 -1.55 -1.80 0.03
Netherlands 1.13 2.36 0.03 -1.48 -2.75 0.05
Portugal 0.59 0.98 0.01 -2.71 -0.91 0.02
Spain 0.73 1.30 0.01 -1.16 -1.57 0.03






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































50Table 6: Bond Yields and Investor Sentiment
Panel A reports summary statistics for bond yields at dierent maturities. y
(n)
t is the yield at time t for
a zero-coupon bond that expires in n years. Data are from 1965m1 to 2007m12. In Panel B, future yield
changes are regressed on the forward-spot spread at corresponding maturity, i.e., the Fama-Bliss factor
(FB). In Panel C, future yield changes are regressed on the current Fama-Bliss factor, sentiment, and their
interaction.












mean 0.055 0.057 0.058 0.060 0.060
std 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027
Skewness 0.888 0.861 0.855 0.847 0.855
Kurtosis 3.940 3.725 3.645 3.573 3.485
AC(1) 0.986 0.989 0.990 0.990 0.991
Panel B: Yield Change Regression
Maturity (FB) t(FB) R2(FB)
2 0.152 0.710 0.004
3 0.412 1.388 0.032
4 0.620 2.832 0.078
5 0.840 3.671 0.128
Panel C: Yield Changes Regression With Sentiment:
Maturity (FB) t(FB) (St) t(st) (st  FB) t(st  FB) R2
2 0.069 0.325 -0.004 -1.928 -0.075 -0.378 0.068
3 0.391 1.322 -0.011 -3.555 -0.170 -0.747 0.241
4 0.691 3.506 -0.011 -3.294 -0.430 -2.466 0.374
5 0.904 5.347 -0.010 -2.293 -0.506 -2.648 0.406
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